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Abstract: Security concerns are often cited as the most prominent reason for not using cloud computing, but customers of
cloud users, especially end-users, frequently do not understand the need to control access to personal informa-
tion. On the other hand, some users might understand the risk, and yet have inadequate means to address it. In
order to make the Cloud a viable alternative for all, accountability of the service providers is key, and with the
advent of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), ignoring accountability is something providers
in the EU market will do at their peril. To be able to hold cloud service providers accountable for how they
manage personal, sensitive and confidential information, there is a need for mechanisms that can mitigate risk,
identify emerging risks, monitor policy violations, manage any incidents, and provide redress. We believe that
being able to offer accountability as part of the service provision will represent a competitive edge for service
providers catering to discerning cloud customers, also outside the GDPR sphere of influence. This paper will
outline the fundamentals of accountability, and provide more details on what the actual “account” is all about.
1 INTRODUCTION
Security concerns are often cited as the most promi-
nent reason for not using cloud computing (CIPL,
2009; Rong et al., 2013). At the same time, customers
of cloud users, especially end-users, frequently do not
understand the need to control access to personal in-
formation. This is particularly evident in the con-
text of social media, where the users are not the cus-
tomers, but the product (being sold to marketers). On
the other hand, some users might understand the risk,
and yet have inadequate means to address it (Cattaneo
et al., 2012). In order to make the Cloud a viable alter-
native for all, accountability of the service providers
is key.
To be able to hold cloud service providers ac-
countable for how they manage personal, sensitive
and confidential information, there is a need for an or-
chestrated set of mechanisms: preventive (mitigating
risk), detective (monitoring and identifying risk and
policy violation), and corrective (managing incidents
and providing redress) (Jaatun et al., 2016).
Suppliers within the cloud eco-system need to be
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able to differentiate themselves in what ultimately is
a commodity market, and being able to offer account-
ability as part of the service provision will represent
a competitive edge for service providers catering to
discerning cloud customers (Pru¨fer, 2013).
2 ACCOUNTABILITY
In order to provide accountability (Pearson, 2017),
providers must facilitate choice for users, and exer-
cise control over handling of data. Such data practices
must be transparent to the users, and the providers
must also be compliant with applicable laws and reg-
ulations.
2.1 Requirements
The starting point is that an accountable organization
must commit to responsible stewardship of other peo-
ple’s data, requiring that it:
• defines what it does,
• monitors how it acts,
• remedies any discrepancies between the former
two,
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• explains and justifies any action.
These elements can be elaborated as follows.
1. An accountable organization must demonstrate
willingness and capacity to be responsible and an-
swerable for its data practices.
2. An accountable organization must define policies
regarding their data practices.
3. An accountable organization must monitor its data
practices.
4. An accountable organization must correct policy
violations.
5. An accountable organization must demonstrate
policy compliance.
In addition to the above, there is a need for ac-
countability across the cloud service provision and
governance chains, and not just in isolation for organi-
zational cloud consumers or cloud service providers.
Hence there is a need for provision of evidence of sat-
isfaction of obligations right along the service pro-
vision chain, as well as aspects such as checking
that partners are accountable too and that there has
been proper allocation of responsibilities along the
service provision chain. These requirements need to
be reflected within the processes for organizations de-
scribed above, but in addition there are implications in
terms of the way that the accountability governance
chains will operate, the scope of risk assessment and
the ways in which other stakeholders are able to hold
this organization to account. In complex, dynamic or
global situations there needs to be a practical solution
for data subjects to obtain both requisite information
about the service provision and remediation.
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Figure 1: A Conceptual Framework for Accountability.
2.2 Conceptual Model
Our conceptual accountability model (see Figure 1)
elaborates on our definition accountability (Jaatun
et al., 2016) by means of a set of
• Accountability Attributes: conceptual elements
of accountability applicable across different do-
mains
• Accountability Practices: emergent behavior
characterizing accountable organizations (that is,
how organizations operationalize accountability
or put accountability into practices)
• Accountability Mechanisms: diverse processes,
non-technical mechanisms and tools that support
accountability practices.
The core attributes of our accountability model
are:
Transparency: the property of a system, organiza-
tion or individual of providing visibility of its gov-
erning norms, behavior and compliance of behav-
ior to the norms.
Responsiveness: the property of a system, organiza-
tion or individual to take into account input from
external stakeholders and respond to queries of
these stakeholders.
Remediability: the property of a system, organiza-
tion or individual to take corrective action and/or
provide a remedy for any party harmed in case of
failure to comply with its governing norms
Responsibility: the property of an organization or in-
dividual in relation to an object, process or system
of being assigned to take action to be in compli-
ance with the norms
Verifiability: the extent to which it is possible to as-
sess norm compliance (i.e. a property of a system,
service or process that its behavior can be checked
against norms)
Appropriateness: the extent to which the technical
and organizational measures used have the capa-
bility of contributing to accountability.
Effectiveness: the extent to which the technical and
organizational measures used actually contribute
to accountability.
To support and implement the main accountabil-
ity attributes, we have developed a ’toolkit’ (Jaatun
et al., 2016) that forms the bottom layer in Figure 1
and from which organizations can select as appropri-
ate.
3 THE ACCOUNT
Provision of accounts (Gittler et al., 2016) is an im-
portant part of the organisational lifecycle, and the
means of demonstrating accountability. The form
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and content of accounts are contextually dependent.
In this section the varying properties of accounts are
considered.
3.1 What is an Account?
An account is a report or description that may be writ-
ten and/or oral, of an event or process. It serves to
report what happened, what has happened, or what
might happen. An account generally contains answers
to the ‘reporters’ questions”, i.e. who, what, where,
when and why. It may also include measures taken to
remedy prior failures. An account of the same event
or process might be provided several times and vary
in its format and information depending on the recip-
ient.
An example where accounts are needed is data
breach notification. In this case, the following infor-
mation should be provided:
• To explain who committed the breach (or if un-
known, how investigation to discover perpetrator)
• What the breach consisted of
• When the breach occurred (and was discovered if
different dates)
• How and why it occurred, extent of breach
• What measures are being taken to prevent any fur-
ther such breaches in future
• Contact information for a department or person to
respond to further questions (and maybe link to
web page for updates)
3.2 Forms of Account
There are two main forms of account: proactive or
retrospective accounts.
Proactive accounts relate to reports before mak-
ing services available. Provision of an account could
be proactive, in the sense that the choice of account-
ability mechanisms and tools needs to be justified to
external parties, and this could happen before any pro-
cessing takes place (perhaps as part of a third party as-
surance review), when processing is particularly risky
(e.g. before such processing, with documentation
generated via Data Protection Impact Assessments),
or using ongoing certification to provide flexibility
(for example, as is the case with Binding Corporate
Rules).
Retrospective accounts are reactive and can either
describe a legitimate event - in which case they can be
either periodic or produced upon request (e.g., trig-
gered by a spot check by a regulator) – or an unex-
pected event, such as a data protection breach.
Furthermore, an interesting distinction can be
made between what may be regarded as static ac-
counts, as opposed to dynamic accounts. The for-
mer do not vary over time, whereas the latter take
into account parameters that may change over time.
For instance, an example of a dynamic account would
be a CSA Open Certification Framework (OCF) level
3 account, which is an example of a dynamic certi-
fication. Indeed, it could be argued that yearly or
monthly audits are irrelevant in an environment that
changes completely on a daily or hourly basis, as
is often the case with cloud computing. Continuous
compliance monitoring is essential to securely deliv-
ering cloud services and ensuring compliance. Cloud
services are inherently dynamic, because the dynamic
provisioning and de-provisioning of resources is a
key part of the cloud value proposition and business
model. Hence, automation for operations and asset
management are essential in this dynamic environ-
ment and verification of compliance with policy and
legislation – such as the EU Data Protection Directive
1995 (Directive 95/46/EC), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA), US federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 1996, and export com-
pliance controls like the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) – requires continuously running
automation. Accounts can be also regarded as a pro-
cess, for example a process of storytelling and expla-
nation.
3.3 Attributes of the Account
Although the description of the event or process is an
essential element, the account should also carry the
following attributes:
• Recipient: This is the actor who receives the ac-
count. Depending on the recipient, the level of
detail in the description of the event may change.
• Event/Process description
• Evidence: Relevant information to support expla-
nation and justification about assertions
• Measures for remediation (if incident)
• Timestamp and signature: The accountable organ-
isation is of course responsible for producing the
account and therefore should sign the entire report
including the date.
Accounts of legitimate events may be periodic and
could sometimes be used as evidence for prior events
whenever an incident happens in the future. A times-
tamp in the report hence becomes mandatory.
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3.4 Interactions between Cloud Actors
Related to Accounts
First we set out the general context in which accounts
are produced, and then the process of generating and
verifying an account.
As discussed further within the A4Cloud concep-
tual framework (Felici et al., 2014), a cloud actor (ac-
countor) is accountable to certain other cloud actors
(accountees) within a cloud ecosystem for:
• Norms: the obligations and permissions that de-
fine data practices; these can be expressed in
policies and they derive from law, contracts and
ethics.
• Behaviour: the actual data processing behaviour
of an organisation.
• Compliance: entails the comparison of an organi-
sation’s actual behaviour with the norms.
For our purposes, the accountors are cloud actors
that are organisations (or individuals with certain re-
sponsibilities within those) acting as a data steward
(for other people’s personal and/or confidential data).
The accountees are other cloud actors, that may in-
clude private accountability agents, consumer organ-
isations, the public at large and entities involved in
governance.
Contracts express legal obligations and business
considerations. Also, policies may express business
considerations that do not end up in contracts. En-
terprise policies are one way in which norms are ex-
pressed, and are influenced by the regulatory environ-
ment, stakeholder expectations and the business ap-
petite for risk. By the accountor exposing the norms
it subscribes to and the things it actually does, via an
account, an external agent can check compliance.
3.5 Accounts Shown to Different Data
Protection Roles
Generally speaking, the sort of information that an or-
ganisation needs to measure and demonstrate in such
an account includes: policies; executive oversight;
staffing and delegation; education and awareness; on-
going risk assessment and mitigation; program risk
assessment oversight and validation; event manage-
ment and compliance handling; internal enforcement;
redress (Accountability Phase, 2010; ICO, 2012).
Existing organisational documents can often be used
to support this analysis (nymity, 2014). Measure-
ment of the achievement needs to be done in conjunc-
tion with the organisation and the external agents that
judge it, which is dependent upon the circumstances,
and to other entities that may need to be notified.
Some examples of accounts that may be provided to
cloud actors fulfilling certain data protection roles in
a given context are shown in Table 1.
3.6 Verification of Accounts
It is not just a question of interaction between actors
in the provision of accounts, but also in the verifi-
cation of accounts. Verification methods may differ
across the different forms of account in the cloud, as
considered further below. As briefly mentioned in
section 3, the company Nymity (nymity, 2014) has
provided an example structure for evidence and asso-
ciated scoring mechanism for accountability based on
existing documentation that can form some of these
types of accounts – but some organisations may want
to take a different approach and so this should not
be regarded as a standard. The Nymity accountabil-
ity evidence framework is intended for collecting ev-
idence in a single organisation and for demonstrat-
ing accountability that is structured around 13 privacy
management processes (nymity, 2014).
There are different levels of verification for ac-
countability, as proposed by Bennett (Bennett, 1995),
which correspond to policies (the level at which most
seals programmes operate), practices and operations.
It is very weak to carry out verification just at the
first of these levels – instead, mechanisms should
be provided that allow verification across all levels.
Most privacy seal programmes just analyse the word-
ing in privacy policies without looking at the other
levels, and thus provide verification only at this first
level (of policies). The second level relates to in-
ternal mechanisms and procedures, and verification
can be carried out about this to determine whether
the key elements of a privacy management framework
are in place within an organisation. Few organisa-
tions however currently subject themselves to a ver-
ification of practices, and thereby being able to prove
whether or not the organisational policies really work
and whether privacy is protected in the operational en-
vironment. To do this, it seems necessary to involve
regular privacy auditing, which may need to be exter-
nal and independent in some cases.
In terms of the verification process, there are vari-
ous different options about how this may be achieved.
There could for example be a push model in terms
of the account being produced by organisations or
else a pull model from the regulatory side; the pro-
duction of accounts could be continuous, periodic or
triggered by events such as breaches. In general,
there should be spot checking by enforcement agen-
cies (properly resourced and with the appropriate au-
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Table 1: Accounts provided by whom to whom and in what circumstances.
Type of Account Data Protection Roles Example Cloud Actor produc-
ing the Account
Account for self-certification/
verification
Data Controller (DC), for Data
Protection Authorities (DPAs)
and their customers
Organisational Cloud Customer
Periodic internal reviews (to
check that mechanisms are op-
erating as needed and update if
required)
DC or Data Processor (DP), for
themselves or auditors
Organisational Cloud Customer,
Cloud Provider
Evidence provided by risk anal-
ysis, PIAs and DPIAs (includ-
ing assessment along the CSP
chain and how this was acted
upon)
DC, for DPAs and their cus-
tomers
Organisational Cloud Customer
External certification e.g.
BCRs, CBPRs, CSA OCF
level 3, privacy seals, account-
ability certifications, security
certifications
DC or DP, for certification bod-
ies (evidence for certification)
or for customers (evidence of
certification)
Organisational Cloud Customer,
Cloud Provider
External audit (ongoing) DC or DP, for auditors (evi-
dence) or customers (audit out-
put)
Organisational Cloud Customer,
Cloud Provider
Verification by accountability
agents
DC to agent, output to DPA Organisational Cloud Customer
Evidence about fault if data
breach
DC to Data Subject (DS), DC to
DPA, DP to DC, DP to DP
Organisational Cloud Customer,
Cloud Provider
thority) that comprehensive programmes are in place
in an organisation to meet the objectives of data pro-
tection. There could in some cases be certification
based on verification, to allow organisations to have
greater flexibility in meeting their goals.
It is often regarded as underpinning an
accountability-based approach that organisations
should be allowed greater control over the practical
aspects of compliance with data protection obliga-
tions in return for an additional obligation to prove
that they have put privacy principles into effect (see
for example (Weitzner et al., 2008)). Hence, that
whole approach relies on the accuracy of the demon-
stration itself. If that is weakened into a mere tick box
exercise, weak self-certification and/or connivance
with an accountability agent that is not properly
checking what the organisation is actually doing,
then the overall effect could in some cases be very
harmful in terms of privacy protection. As Bennett
points out ( (Bennett, 2012) p. 45), due to resource
issues regulators will need to rely upon surrogates,
including private sector agents, to be agents of
accountability, and it is important within this process
that they are able to have a strong influence over the
acceptability of different third party accountability
mechanisms.
In particular, it is important that the verification
is carried out by a trusted body that does not collude
with the accountor, and that it is given sufficient re-
sources to carry out the checking, as well as there be-
ing enough business incentive (for example, via large
fines) that organisations wish to provide appropriate
evidence to this body and indeed implement the right
mechanisms in the first place.
The overall process around verification of an ac-
count is summarised within Figure 2.
First of all, there is a certain context in which the
‘start’ – labelled (1) within Figure 2 - would apply,
in other words the context in which an organisation
might need to give an account, or might wish to do
this voluntarily. Broadly speaking, these situations re-
quiring or involving production of an account may be
characterised as follows:
• Regulatory obligation: The most typical situation
where there is a legal obligation to produce an ac-
count is where governmental bodies or regulatory
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Figure 2: High-level view of the provision and verification of an account.
agencies enforce rights or obligations, by means
of an investigation, a request for information or a
spot check by a Data Protection Authority (DPA).
• Contractual undertaking: A legal obligation could
instead come from the organisation itself, for in-
stance from a contractual obligation to give an
account. The cloud service provider may have
given a contractual obligation in its terms of ser-
vice or in a SLA that it would provide an ac-
count (for example, a data breach notification pro-
cedure) or that it would demonstrate compliance
in some way. Another situation may be that the
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) has undertaken to
get third party certification for compliance or for
some process and so is required by the third party
to give an account of certain processes in order to
get certification.
• Voluntary undertaking to give an account: The
CSP may just state (in a policy published on its
website for example) that it would provide an ac-
count in certain circumstances or make ‘best ef-
forts’ to do so. Many policies published in this
way are not legally binding or may not be incor-
porated into the contract between the CSP or the
customer, so the CSP can refuse to give the ac-
count or may claim that it cannot do so and has
made a ‘best effort’.
Next, supposing this context is in place, the organ-
isation (as accountor) is supposed to give account of
not only its actions, but also its results and intentions
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to the accountee cf. (2) in Figure 2. Exactly what
must be provided will vary according to the context;
for example, specific information will be expected in
the case of the accountor wishing to be certified.
If an organisation gives no account in the first
place, there should be repercussions about this that
might include the obligation to give a refined account,
defined according to the accountees’ or assessors’
needs, cf. (3) in Figure 2. For example, in the case of
regulatory requests, the consequences could be fines.
In the case of contractual undertakings, failure to pro-
duce an account would be a breach of contract that
entitles the customer to damages, or service credits
(for breach of SLA) or gives a right to the customer to
terminate the contract without notice. Failure to pro-
duce an account needed for a third party certification
of compliance would mean that the CSP could not ob-
tain the certification. This may have direct legal con-
sequences for the relationship between the CSP and
its customer (depending on whether this was a condi-
tion of the contract) because the customer may decide
to terminate or not to renew the contract. In the case
of a voluntary undertaking, although there would be
no legal redress for the customers, the consequences
of refusal to give an account may involve damage to
its reputation by disgruntled customers.
If the organisation does provide an account, this
can result in one or more documents being provided,
or information being captured by other means, as the
account provided by the organisation could be writ-
ten or oral, cf. (4) in Figure 2. For further informa-
tion, see for example (Vranaki, 2016) which expands
upon real life cases in which multiple accounts can
be created by a Data Controller for presentation to a
regulator.
The accountee then assesses the account (5), po-
tentially making reference to additional information
(6). The level of satisfaction with the account is
gauged (7), in the sense that the account may be
judged to show that the organisation is compliant (if
appropriate), or else may be judged to provide a sat-
isfactory explanation about a data breach event. On
the other hand, the accountee may judge the organ-
isation to not be compliant (and hence for example,
not issue a certificate of compliance) (9), or wish to
have additional information about the event. Espe-
cially in the case of a data protection report, the ac-
countee probably requires more than just information,
in other words clarification, explanation, updating and
also most probably corrective action. Hence, even if
the account process is complete in the sense that the
accountee may accept the account is accurate and may
be satisfied with it, it could be that they are not sat-
isfied in the sense that the account shows that some
action/omission has caused and is causing harm and
needs additional action. For this reason, the ‘End of
account’ (10) may only be the start of another process,
even if the accountee is satisfied with the account.
‘Next steps based on account’ reflects that this pro-
cess may follow; it could include for example reme-
diation, actions based on the account, further investi-
gation, etc. After all, an account of a breach should
contain something about ongoing corrective action.
Accountability agents or other third parties could
be used to provide verification of accounts, and serve
as an intermediary to the ultimate accountees, some
of whom may impose sanctions (8). If, as considered
within D:C-2.1 (Felici et al., 2014), there is a good
trust relationship between such an agent and the ac-
countee, then the agent’s account is likely to be di-
rectly accepted by the other accountees.
The account process is taken to finish (10) if ei-
ther an account has been provided that is found to be
satisfactory by the accountee or an agent acting on its
behalf, or the account is not found to be adequate and
appropriate actions are taken by the accountee against
the accountor. However, this notion of ‘finishing’ is
too coarse-grained, as discussed above. Furthermore,
accountability is not a binary state, but has a certain
level of maturity. Correspondingly, accounts have a
certain effectiveness and appropriateness. Depending
on the maturity an accountee may be satisfied or not,
and the threshold of this maturity might differ depend-
ing on the accountees or the event about which one is
asked to give an account. Hence, more mature ac-
count might be provided, or different ones for differ-
ent accountees, events, etc., so this is another reason
why ‘End of account’ is not necessarily an end state,
but the process might be repeated from the start with
a different degree of maturity or threshold.
Sanctions might be applied at several points, no-
tably if the organisation does not provide an account
in the first place (3), if it fails to respond adequately
to the dialogue with the assessor, or if the assessor is
not satisfied in respect to the accounts produced (9).
In fact, the use of the word ‘sanction’, here mean-
ing a consequence of an inadequate or non-provision
of an account, is avoided when listing accountabil-
ity artefacts (Gittler et al., 2016), because in legal
terms ‘sanction’ refers to a punishment imposed by
a legal or regulatory authority, for example fine, im-
prisonment of penalties for disobedience, whereas we
also want to include non-regulatory actions imposed
by the accountee, which is perhaps the customer, and
this could for example mean contract termination or
perhaps a contractual penalty for failure to produce a
report. Such consequences or repercussions are there-
fore represented quite broadly in Figure 2 as actions
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by the accountee against the accountor.
The process of providing an account could be
quite complex, and this is just a generic overview
of that process. There could be multiple documents
that in the form described here provide an account,
but each of which may be viewed as an individual ac-
count, and perhaps even have a slightly different pro-
cess flow. For example, multiple accounts provided
by different parties within an organisation could be
aggregated by a senior officer, who acts as a commu-
nication interface with the accountee (in this case, the
regulator); this officer would interact further if needed
with the various internal teams that produced the ac-
counts if further information is required.
The element of responsiveness is not necessarily
in the account itself, yet in the interaction between
what the account should be about (and how it should
be refined if deemed inappropriate) and in the estab-
lishment of the account objects, i.e. the norms that
need to be compared with actual behaviour (com-
pliance). Part of the norms to which actual (sys-
tem) behaviour is compared should be defined in a
two-way communication (dialogue) between cloud
providers and external stakeholders, which includes
cloud users, regulators and the public at large.
The process of generating and verifying accounts
for certification could be more specialised than the
flow shown in Figure 2 (for example, it could involve
assessment by multiple parties) and would need to
be adapted as the purpose of verification of the ac-
count and possible outcomes would differ, i.e. result
in a certain level certification, or no certification being
given.
This flow shown in Figure 2 is a generic flow that
could apply in range of contexts and is not cloud-
specific. With regard to cloud contexts, as with other
service provision delivery contexts involving a chain
of providers, provision of an account might involve
chaining of accounts. For example, an account pro-
vided by an organisation using the cloud that is act-
ing in the capacity of a data controller, to a data pro-
tection authority might be constructed using accounts
that had previously been provided to it from the cloud
service providers that it was using.
4 DISCUSSION
Accountability is a difficult concept to define, and
many European languages even lack a word for it.
Numerous definitions of accountability exist in differ-
ent domains (such as public policy, financial sector or
enterprise operations), and each focuses on slightly
different, context specific, aspects. Hence there is
no consensus on a single definition. The EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU, 2016)
defines accountability as being “responsible for, and
be[ing] able to demonstrate compliance with [princi-
ples relating to processing of personal data]” (Arti-
cle 5), and details many accountability elements in-
cluding (in Article 22) a list of a Data Controller’s
accountability instruments:
• Policies
• Documenting processing operations
• Implementing security requirements
• Data Protection Impact Assessments
• Prior authorisation/consultation by Data Protec-
tion Authorities (DPAs)
• Data Protection Officer
• If proportional, independent internal or external
audits
Ten years ago, Lampson (Lampson, 2004) listed
accountability as one of the three core objectives of
having a security policy, alongside usage control and
availability. It is thus surprising that accountability
has had such a little impact on the Cloud services that
are currently on offer.
The big Cloud providers that currently dominate
the international market have such economic power
that they effectively could ignore any European at-
tempts at forcing them to run their business the way
the European Union (EU) thinks they should. How-
ever, the GDPR (EU, 2016), with its significantly
higher economic penalties, is poised to change that.
What we have presented is only part of the puzzle
for modern services. The kind of tools that we have
outlined (Jaatun et al., 2016) will need to be comple-
mented by other security tools to make security and
privacy stronger, for instance by enforcing confiden-
tiality and anonymity where desired.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented fundamental require-
ments that we believe must be met by Cloud providers
wishing to be accountable stewards of their cus-
tomers’ data.
The kinds of tools we have outlined (Jaatun et al.,
2016) all contribute to an accountability-based ap-
proach, increasing transparency for Cloud users, and
enabling Cloud providers to “do the right thing” with
respect to accountability along the provider chain.
We believe that providers soon will be required to
justify their practices and mechanisms for handling
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customers’ data to external parties (Pearson, 2013),
and that a certification scheme inevitably will emerge,
much like we see for the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (PCI-DSS, 2013).
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APPENDIX
Abbreviations
BCR: Binding Corporate Rules
CBPR: Cross-Border Privacy Rules
CSA: Cloud Security Alliance
CSP: Cloud Service Provider
DC: Data Controller
DP: Data Processor
DPA: Data Protection Authority
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DPIA: Data Protection Impact Assessment
DS: Data Subject
OCF: Open Certification Framework
PIA: Privacy Impact Assessment
PCI-DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard
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